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Financial Services in the United States and United
Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to Securities
Regulation and Dispute Resolution
Cory Alpert*
I. INTRODUCTION
In global financial markets, the variety of complex financial
instruments and investment strategies offered to investors creates the
potential for highly technical and sophisticated disputes. Dispute
resolution mechanisms in two of the world’s major financial centers,
New York and London, reflect distinct approaches to handling
customer complaints against providers of financial services. In the
United States, the dominant forum for dispute resolution between
brokers and investors is binding arbitration, which requires
customers to arbitrate securities law claims rather than sue in federal
courts.1 In the United Kingdom, customers of regulated financial
businesses often submit their claims to a financial ombudsman, an
informal scheme that employs procedures quite unlike formal
arbitration.2 Nevertheless, in both markets alternative dispute
resolution options have shifted a large portion of the responsibility
for private enforcement of securities law from the courts to the
specialized entities that administer them.
This Article describes the regulatory background and dispute
resolution schemes for financial services in the United States and the
United Kingdom, with emphasis on procedural differences and
allocation of forum choice between investors and firms. In its
comparison of the United Kingdom’s system with recent trends in
U.S. dispute resolution, this Article highlights advantages and
disadvantages to firms and customers. In conclusion, this Article
suggests that modifying the United States’ system to emphasize
mediation would create a more efficient, inexpensive, and equitable
method of resolving customer disputes.

* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom LLP; J.D., Boston University;
B.A., University of California, Berkeley.
1. Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration, Financial Markets and Banking Disputes, 14 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 274 (2003).
2. See About the Financial Ombudsman Service, http://www.financialombudsman.org.uk/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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II. FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
UNITED KINGDOM
A basic knowledge of financial services regulation is necessary to
understand the dispute resolution process for securities transactions.
This Part provides an overview of financial services regulation in the
United States and the United Kingdom.
A. United States
In the United States, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)3
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)4
provide the statutory framework governing securities transactions.
Congress passed these laws in response to the serious abuses and
fraud perpetrated on the financial markets that led to the October
1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression. To boost
investor confidence and prevent future market collapses, these Acts
created affirmative disclosure requirements aimed at increasing
market transparency and policing security issuers and broker-dealers.5
The Securities Act regulates the primary market—direct sales
from issuers—and requires issuers to register every offer or sale of a
security in the United States, except for certain exempted
transactions.6 The Exchange Act established the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).7 The SEC regulates the secondary
trading of securities between persons generally unaffiliated with the
issuer and requires all publicly traded companies to make periodic
disclosures. The broad coverage of the Exchange Act also governs
securities exchanges, over-the-counter markets, broker-dealers, and
securities associations.8 Firms, exchanges, associations, and
individuals must register with the SEC and, where applicable, a selfregulatory organization (SRO).9 According to section 6 of the
Exchange Act, the National Association of Securities Dealers

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 78a–78mm (2000).
Id. § 2.
See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 3–5, 12.
Id. § 4.
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., JOEL SELIGMAN & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION 52 (Thompson/West, 10th ed. 2007). See also Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 2, 6.
9. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 5, 6 (securities exchanges); § 15 (brokerdealers); § 15A (securities associations), § 19 (SROs).
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(NASD), an SRO created to regulate broker-dealers,10 and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), a National Securities Exchange (NSE)
must have rules “designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of free
trade . . . and in general to protect investors and the public
interest.”11
To ensure proper governance and legal compliance, brokerdealers must register with an SRO before transacting in securities12
or participating in a securities exchange. As a result, large brokerdealers are subject to the duplicative jurisdiction of multiple SROs
and the overarching disciplinary authority of the SEC.13 After both
the NYSE and NASD became publicly held corporations, the move
towards creating a single self-regulatory body gained momentum.14
Consequentially, in July 2007, consolidation of the NASD and the
member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the
NYSE resulted in the creation of the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA).15 FINRA is the largest non-government
regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.16
Like its predecessors, FINRA is an SRO subject to SEC oversight.17
A key to achieving transparency in the financial markets is
effective enforcement of securities laws. The SEC focuses on antifraud enforcement, whereas FINRA deals with matters of negligence
and unprofessional conduct falling short of fraud.18 FINRA Dispute
Resolution (FINRADR) investigates complaints against brokerage
10. Id. § 15A; COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 640. The label “broker” refers to
any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others, while the label “dealer” refers to any person engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise. Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)–(5).
11. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 6.
12. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 58 (“Under § 15(b)(8)–(9) a broker-dealer
may not effect securities transaction [sic] unless it is a member of a registered securities
association (i.e. NASD), unless it limits its activities to a stock exchange of which it is a
member. This effectively ensures that virtually every broker-dealer must join the NASD and
comply with its rules; suspension or expulsion by the NASD as a practical matter means
disbarment from the industry.”).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 641–42.
15. About FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
16. Id.
17. George H. Friedman, Update on NASD Dispute Resolution Activities, 1553
PLI/Corp 69, 71 (2006).
18. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 641.
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firms and their employees. It conducts enforcement actions against
parties and individuals who violate statutory provisions or SEC or
FINRA rules.19 Disciplinary actions can lead to fines, suspensions,
expulsion from the securities industry, or referral to the SEC or
federal or state enforcement agencies.20 FINRA finances its activities
with industry dues, allowing for a large enforcement budget for
industry surveillance and monitoring.21
B. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom embarked on the modernization and
consolidation of its financial services regulatory scheme in 1986,
when the London Stock Exchange first welcomed international
financial services firms to the marketplace22 and Parliament passed
the Financial Services Act (FSA 1986).23 The new regulations sought
to boost investor confidence by broadening disclosure, improving
business practices, and efficiently discovering and sanctioning
securities law violators.24 FSA 1986 created three levels of authority
to regulate the financial services industry.25 The first and highest level
of authority is a governmental body called the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI).26 DTI transferred primary regulatory
responsibility to the second level, a non-governmental regulatory
body called the Securities and Investments Board (SIB).27 The SIB
developed a framework of rules and regulations and granted
recognition to SROs and certain professional bodies, the third level
of regulatory authority,28 which directly monitored the activities of

19. Id. at 58.
20. FINRA, Investor Complaint Program: What to do When Problems Arise 1 (2007),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/inv_info/documents/investor_information/p011944.pd
f [hereinafter FINRA Investor Brochure].
21. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 57.
22. James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violations in the United Kingdom,
9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 131, 132 (1991).
23. Id. (stating that FSA 1986 came into force on April 29, 1988).
24. Id. at 133.
25. Id. at 134.
26. In 2007, DTI became the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform. See The Department of Trade and Industry (1983-2007), http://www.berr.gov.uk/
aboutus/corporate/history/outlines/DTI-1983-onwards/page13934.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
27. Fishman, supra note 22, at 134.
28. Robert W. Helm & Kevin K. Babikian, Creating, Managing and Distributing
Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, 1529 PLI/CORP. 675, 848 (2006).
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their members, the financial services firms.29 In 1997, the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) replaced the SIB as Parliament considered
further financial services legislation.30
In the period from 2000 to 2001, a newly developed legal
framework replaced much of the pre-existing financial services
legislation, including FSA 1986. This new framework, known as the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), now
governs the conduct of investment business by firms and
individuals.31 FSMA 2000 consolidated regulatory power from the
existing business regulators into the existing FSA.32 The FSA is
responsible for enforcing FSMA 2000 legislation relating to
investment business.33 The FSA’s four statutory objectives include:
(1) maintaining market confidence, (2) promoting public awareness,
(3) protecting consumers, and (4) reducing financial crime.34 Like
FSA 1986,35 FSMA 2000 delegates power to the FSA to promulgate
secondary legislation regulating many important details.36 The FSA
Handbook contains promulgated FSA rules and regulations.37
Although FSMA 2000 outlines the functions and regulatory
objectives of the FSA,38 the FSA is “operationally independent of the
government and funded entirely by the firms it regulates.”39
29. Fishman, supra note 22, at 134–35.
30. Helm & Babikian, supra note 28, at 849.
31. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, United Kingdom and United States
Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 317,
330 (2003).
32. The existing regulators consolidated into FSA under FSMA 2000 were the Building
Societies Commission, the Friendly Societies Commission, the Investment Management
Regulatory Organization, the Personal Investment Authority, the Register of Friendly
Societies, and the Securities and Futures Authority. FSA had also assumed responsibility for
banking supervision from the Bank of England and U.K. Listing Authority from the London
Stock Exchange. FSA later assumed responsibility for mortgage regulation and general
insurance business regulation. FSA History, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/
History/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
33. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 31, at 331.
34. Id. at 332; Press Release, FSA, FSA’s New Investment Rules Come Into Force
(Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/
2007/111.shtml.
35. Thomas J. Pack, International Trade: Regulation of London’s Financial Markets—
The Financial Services Act, 1986, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J. 196, 200 (1987).
36. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, Part I, § 1 (U.K.).
37. FSA Handbook, http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/ (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
38. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c.8, Part I, § 2 (functions), §§ 3–6
(Objectives) (U.K.).
39. FSA, Who Are We, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/index.shtml (last
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III. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The approaches for resolving financial services industry disputes
within the United Kingdom and the United States differ greatly. In
the wake of the Securities and Exchange Acts of the 1930s, the U.S.
dispute resolution mechanism developed from litigation to binding
arbitration. Ironically, modern U.S. arbitration—with its increased
formalities and legalities—has come to more closely resemble
litigation. Conversely, the United Kingdom employs an informal
approach, lacking many of the constricting legalities found in the
U.S. system.
A. United States -- Binding Arbitration and the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority
Broker-dealers, acting as personal advisors, salespersons and
purchasers of securities, engage in significant levels of direct
interaction with the investing public and each other. Due to the
frequency, highly personal nature, and element of investor risk
involved, these interactions tend to give rise to many private
complaints. Until the late 1980s, defrauded or otherwise injured
investors were able to sue their broker-dealers in U.S. courts for
damages.40 Following several Supreme Court decisions enforcing
arbitration agreements, arbitration clauses are now standard in most
customer agreements, compelling parties to arbitrate rather than
litigate.
1. History of securities arbitration
Through the late 1980s, U.S. investors could and often did sue
their broker-dealers when high-risk investments produced
disappointing results. This threat of private enforcement encouraged
broker-dealers to self-police their activities. Some statutory
provisions and SEC regulations provided explicit or implied private
causes of action for investors.41 Provisions in both the Securities Act42
visited Jan. 30, 2008). The FSA is a company limited by guarantee, an alternative type of
corporation used primarily for non-profit organizations that require legal personality. Helm &
Babikian, supra note 28, at 851; FSA, supra note 39.
40. See COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1139.
41. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975)
(discussing history and overwhelming consensus that an implied private right of action exists
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5).
42. Securities Act of 1933 § 14.
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and the Exchange Act43 state “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person . . . to waive compliance with any
provision of [this statute or any rule or regulations thereunder] shall
be void.”44 In 1953, the United States Supreme Court in Wilko v.
Swan45 held that an agreement to arbitrate was a “stipulation” and
that “the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of ‘provision’
that cannot be waived” under the Securities Act.46 Therefore, an
arbitration clause did not bar the security buyer from seeking a
judicial remedy.47
However, the Wilko decision was “not easily reconcilable” with
the legislative policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),48
which supported the enforcement of arbitration agreements as a
means of securing a “prompt, economical and adequate solution of
controversies.”49 The Supreme Court confronted this policy conflict
in 1974 when it held in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. that a predispute arbitration agreement was enforceable in a suit alleging a
violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act.50 The Court held that the
purchaser-seller agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the
transaction was valid and enforceable by the federal courts pursuant
to the FAA.51 The Court distinguished Scherk from Wilko on its facts
as Scherk dealt with an international contract where an opposing
party might utilize foreign courts to “block or hinder access to the
American court of the purchaser’s choice.”52
In 1977, the SEC helped establish the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA)—composed of various
representatives of SROs, the Securities Industry Association (SIA),
and the public—in order to suggest and promulgate improvements
for investor dispute resolution by means of arbitration.53 SICA
43. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a).
44. Securities Act of 1933 § 14.
45. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
46. Id. at 434–35; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 512 (1974)
(quoting Wilko).
47. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434–38; see also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510 (describing the Wilko
Court’s holding).
48. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; see also The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
14 (2008).
49. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
50. 417 U.S. at 509 (alleging fraudulent representations concerning the status of
trademark rights).
51. Id. at 519–20.
52. Id. at 518.
53. Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. &

81

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 5

developed a uniform code of arbitration procedures adopted by
participating SROs in 1979 and 1980.54 Following the efforts of
SICA and the SROs, courts began to change their perception of
arbitration as a fair and efficient option for investor disputes. In the
late 1980s, a series of Supreme Court decisions favored the
enforcement of arbitration clauses in areas previously considered
non-arbitrable because of statutory interpretation.55 These decisions
interpreted the FAA as a congressional mandate against judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements.56
In 1987, Shearson/American Express Inc. et al. v. McMahon et al.
addressed the arbitrability of financial services disputes.57 The
Supreme Court held that investors who had signed pre-dispute
arbitration clauses could be compelled to arbitrate their Exchange
Act claims arising from a domestic transaction, and that arbitration
provides investors with adequate protection of their rights.58
Moreover, in 1989, the Court overturned Wilko regarding the
arbitrability of securities law disputes,59 and enforced an agreement
to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Act in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.60
Since then, broker-dealer firms have generally included predispute arbitration clauses in their standard customer agreements,
binding both sides to arbitrate disputes relating to or arising out of
future business activities. The FAA and many similar statutes enacted
by the states recognize these agreements as binding and provide for
their enforcement.61 Unless circumstances suggest that the
arbitration agreement was procured by fraud or that the firm has
waived its right to arbitration, compulsory arbitration is required to
resolve investor disputes.62 “Arbitrations are conducted in
accordance with the Uniform Code of Arbitration as developed by
FIN. L. 413, 420–21 (2006).
54. Id. at 422.
55. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985); Sonatrach v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
56. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225 (quoting Scherk).
57. Id. at 220.
58. See id. at 233.
59. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1139.
60. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 477.
61. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2008).
62. See id. § 2.
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the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) and the
rules of the sponsoring organization where the claim is filed.”63
After MacMahon, the SEC sought to reform SICA arbitration
procedures (and thereby those of the SROs), suggesting and
approving rules that mandated evidentiary hearings and discovery
processes, and required arbitrators to apply the law in reaching their
decisions.64 In justifying mandatory arbitration of customer
complaints arising under the federal securities laws, the Supreme
Court in MacMahon referenced the SEC’s “expansive power to
ensure adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the
SROs.”65 The SEC, however, currently dedicates few resources to
the oversight of securities arbitration, and as a result, self-interested
SROs have revised the rules with little regulatory interference.66 The
most notable SRO revisions come from FINRA, which often
proposes and adopts its own arbitration rules and introduces
formalized procedures. These procedures are not embraced in the
Uniform Rules, which are mainly derived from SEC
recommendations and promulgated by the SICA.67
2. Current system of securities arbitration
FINRA administers “the largest [U.S.] dispute resolution forum
for investors and registered firms.”68 FINRA Dispute Resolution
(FINRADR) provides both mediation and arbitration, and suggests,
but does not require, that an aggrieved investor first attempt to
resolve the conflict with the brokerage firm’s management.69 The
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedures for Customer Disputes
(FINRA Code) applies to any dispute between a customer and a
63. FINRA Arbitration Procedures, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/
Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
64. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1000 (2002).
65. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987); see also Jill I.
Gross, Securities Mediation, Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OH. S. J. D. R.
329, 346 (2006) (quoting McMahon).
66. Margaret Jacobs, SEC Faces Criticism for Role in the Oversight of Arbitration, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 15, 1995, at C1.
67. See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 466. An SRO may propose a new rule by sending a §
19(b) (of the Exchange Act) filing to the SEC.
68. FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/
AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
69. FINRA, Tour of the Dispute Resolution Process, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/OverviewOfDisputeResolutionProcess/index.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter FINRADR Tour].
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“member” that is submitted to arbitration.70 Members include any
broker, dealer, or associated person admitted to NASD (now
FINRA).71 Under the FINRA Code, customers and members decide
whether to arbitrate when a dispute arises.72 Brokerage customers are
only compelled to arbitrate claims against their financial service
providers if they are subject to a pre-dispute arbitration clause.73
Under FINRA rules, members of FINRA are always bound to
arbitration if their customer so chooses.74
An investor seeking to recover money or securities will most
likely be bound to pursue a remedy through FINRADR, as FINRA
exercises jurisdiction over the vast majority of brokerage firms.75
Likewise, FINRADR handles virtually all securities arbitration claims
filed by its customers, including “unsuitable recommendations,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, churning, and failure to supervise.”76
Arbitration claims filed with FINRA are primarily resolved through
negotiation or mediation settlements77 that compensate the claimant
more than seventy percent of the time.78 FINRADR charges
claimants a non-refundable filing fee for handling the arbitration in
addition to a hearing session deposit. It also recommends that
investors engage an attorney for mediation and arbitration, since in
most cases the brokerage firm will have retained counsel.79
Once an investor is compelled to arbitrate a claim, the modern
process is akin to litigation with only slight variation. Arbitration,
despite being touted as a “quick, fair, and relatively inexpensive”
alternative to litigation, employs similarly formal procedures that
increase costs and cause delays. 80 First, the complainant files an initial
70. FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, R. 12101(a) (2008),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6077
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter FINRA Code].
71. Id. R. 12100(o).
72. Id. R. 12201.
73. Id. R. 12200.
74. Id. R. 12101(a).
75. FINRA Investor Brochure, supra note 20, at 3. However, FINRA does not govern
investment advisers, transfer agents, mutual funds, and public companies, which are subject to
SEC and state securities regulators.
76. FINRA
Dispute
Resolution
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Overview/FactSheet/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2009) [hereinafter FINRADR Fact Sheet].
77. FINRADR Tour, supra note 69.
78. FINRA Investor Brochure, supra note 20, at 11.
79. Id.
80. The Arbitrator’s Manual 1 (2007) http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
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statement of claim with the Director of Dispute Resolution,
“specifying the relevant facts and remedies requested.”81 The
respondent then serves an answer including relevant facts, available
defenses and any counterclaims.82 A panel, usually consisting of three
arbitrators, is appointed to consider the initial statement of claim and
all responsive pleadings.83 All panel members are chosen from a
FINRA-maintained roster comprised of public, non-public, and
eligible chairperson arbitrators.84 In customer disputes, chairpersons
must be public arbitrators with special qualifications.85 Similar to
litigation, the parties are subject to a discovery process86 including
depositions,87 motion hearings on disputed collateral matters,88 and
possible sanctions for failure to comply with any of the FINRA Code
requirements.89 The parties produce witnesses and the arbitrators
have the authority to issue subpoenas where necessary to compel
production of documents or persons to appear.90 Except in certain
circumstances, parties present their evidence in the form of testimony
and documents in a litigation-like hearing before the arbitral panel.91
Unlike litigation, however, evidence is admissible notwithstanding
state or federal evidence rules,92 although witnesses must testify
under oath or affirmation.93 If the parties proceed to an award, the
FINRA Code requires that a majority of arbitrators agree on rulings
and determinations,94 but does not require written opinions.95
“Awards are subject to judicial review on the merits” only for

ArbitrationMediation/@arbmed/@neutrl/documents/ArbMed/P009668.pdf (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
81. FINRA Code, supra note 70, R. 12302.
82. Id. R. 12303.
83. Id. R. 123401. The panel for claims of $25,000 or less consists of one arbitrator.
For claims of more than $50,000 the panel may consist of three arbitrators unless otherwise
requested by both parties. For claims between $25,000 and $50,000, any party may request
three arbitrators instead of one.
84. Id. R. 12400(b).
85. Id. R. 12400(c).
86. Id. R. 12505.
87. Id. R. 12510.
88. Id. R. 12503.
89. Id. R. 8310.
90. Id. R. 12512.
91. See id. pts. V & VI.
92. Id. R. 12604.
93. Id. R. 12605.
94. Id. R. 12414.
95. Id. R.12904(f) (“The award may contain a rationale underlying the award.”).
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“manifest disregard” of the law and “do not serve as precedent.”96
This limited judicial review and absence of a required reasoned
opinion allows arbitrators to base awards in favor of claimants on
“general equity grounds.”97
B. United Kingdom -- Optional Ombudsman and the Financial
Ombudsman Service
In the United Kingdom, the dispute resolution mechanism
differs vastly from that of the United States. In addition to creating
the newly consolidated authority of the FSA, FSMA 2000 replaced
all previous dispute resolution schemes operating in the financial
services, banking, and insurance sectors with the Financial
Ombudsman Service (FOS). The FOS is a single, compulsory
ombudsman scheme for the resolution of disputes between members
of the public and “authorized persons.”98
Because U.S. courts must consider both the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act with respect to arbitration, they encounter issues
of conflicting legislative policy. FMSA 2000 sidestepped these issues
by providing for its own specially tailored dispute resolution scheme.
Established by Part XVI of FSMA 2000, the ombudsman scheme
aims to provide quick and informal resolution to financial disputes. It
is free to complainants and does not require legal representation.99
This scheme is available prior to arbitration or litigation, and thus
causes no friction with the U.K.’s Arbitration Act 1996, which
provides as a general principle that “parties should be free to agree
how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are
necessary in the public interest.”100
In the instance where a customer brings the claim to the FOS,
the ultimate decision is binding to authorized persons or firms
subject to compulsory jurisdiction.101 While the FSA established the
96. Black & Gross, supra note 64, at 992.
97. Katsoris, supra note 53, at 459–60.
98. Part XVI of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 describes the Ombudsman
Scheme. See Explanatory Notes to FSMA, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2000/
2000en08.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter FSMA Explanatory Notes]. Authorized
persons include a person who has permission under Part IV to carry on one or more regulated
activities. If a firm has permission, it is authorized to carry on the regulated activities concerned
in the name of the firm. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 §§ 31–32.
99. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 225(1).
100. Arbitration Act 1996, ch. 23, pt. I, § 1.
101. FSMA 2000 § 226 requires authorized firms to submit to the jurisdiction of the
scheme. FSMA Explanatory Notes, supra note 98.
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requirements of FOS compulsory jurisdiction, the FOS specifies
voluntary jurisdiction subject to FSA approval.102 This procedure
allows firms to contractually agree to resolve disputes through the
ombudsman scheme, even if they are not “authorized firms” or if the
disputed activities are beyond the scope of the compulsory
jurisdiction.103 However, the firm’s activities must be subject, or
potentially subject, to the compulsory jurisdiction rules.104
The FOS dispute resolution system is designed to be free and
accessible to complainants.105 Accordingly, it funds itself through
levies and case fees required of member businesses.106 The levy
applies only to regulated businesses and varies with the size of the
business. Businesses subject to complaints are obligated to pay an
“individual case fee” when a complaint becomes “chargeable.”107
Because businesses fund the FOS, investors do not pay a fee for the
resolution of their claims.
However, investors face several jurisdictional hurdles. The FOS is
available only to investors who have been unable to resolve their
complaint after exhausting the internal complaint-handling
mechanism of their lender, bank, insurer, adviser, or investment
firm.108 To ensure that customers meet this requirement, firms must
have complaint-handling procedures that comply with minimum
standards specified in the FSA Handbook.109 These procedures
require the firm to issue a “final response” to the investor, either
accepting or rejecting the complaint, potentially offering some form
102. FSMA 2000 § 227 sets out voluntary jurisdiction. For further discussion, see also
Rhoda James & Phillip Morris, The New Financial Ombudsman Service in the United
Kingdom: Has the Second Generation Got it Right?, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CONSUMERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 182 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Thomas G.W. Telfer eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2003).
103. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 227.
104. Id. § 227(4).
105. Rhoda James, The New Dispute Resolution System in the U.K. Financial Services
Industry, J. INT’L FIN MKTI.F.M 2002, 4(6), 191, 191 (2002).
106. Financial Ombudsman Service, A Quick Guide to. . . Funding and Case Fees,
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/QG1.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Guide to Funding].
107. Id. A case is ‘chargeable’ when it passes the initial stage of complaint review.
Currently, businesses are only charged these fees for the third and subsequent complaints in a
year. http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/faq/answers/research_a5.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2009). It appears that firms under voluntary jurisdiction also pay individual case fees.
Id.
108. James & Morris, supra note 102, at 177.
109. Id. The newly revised dispute handling rules are available online at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DISP (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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of settlement or explanation, and notifying the customer of his rights
if he is dissatisfied.110 Customers may not bring claims to the FOS
unless they have received the “final response”111 or, in the absence of
a response, until eight weeks pass after filing the complaint.112
Consumers who receive an early “final response” from a firm or
pass the full waiting period may face other “time bar” jurisdictional
hurdles that must be satisfied before the FOS may consider the
merits of a complaint.113 Time limits for referral of complaints to the
FOS bar the consumer from addressing the ombudsman more than
six months after the consumer receives the firm’s final response, or
more than six years after the event from which the complaint arises,
except in exceptional circumstances.114 For example, if the customer
was unaware of the grounds for the complaint, the ombudsman may
hear their case within three years after the investor became, or should
reasonably have become, aware of those grounds.115
For customers whose complaints are within FOS jurisdiction, the
FOS is a inexpensive alternative that is far less formal than litigation
or arbitration. Once the FOS accepts a complaint, an investigation
ensues. If the ombudsman believes that mediation may be more
appropriate for resolving the complaint, he may initiate negotiation
of a settlement between the parties at the earliest possible stage.116 If
investigation seems necessary, the ombudsman gives both parties the
opportunity to make written submissions. The parties then receive a
provisional assessment setting out the ombudsman’s reasons and
establishing a time limit within which the parties must respond.117 If
either party objects to the provisional assessment within the time

110. See
FSA
Handbook,
Glossary
Definition
of
Final
Response,
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/glossary-html/handbook/Glossary/F?definition=G411 (last
visited Jan. 30, 2009).
111. “Customers” include certain types of small businesses and charities as well. James,
supra note 105.
112. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 2.8.1 R; see also FSMA 2000 § 226 (setting
the circumstances in which a complaint can be dealt with: namely, that the complainant meets
the relevant eligibility criteria, set by the Authority, and has asked the ombudsman to consider
the case). FSMA Explanatory Notes, supra note 98.
113. FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE ANNUAL REVIEW 2006/2007, at 44 (2007),
available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar07/index.html (follow
“annual review 2006/07 - PDF version [opens in new window]” hyperlink) [hereinafter
Annual Review 2007].
114. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 2.8.2 R8.
115. Id. at 2.8.2(2)(b).
116. Id. at 3.5.1 R.
117. Id. at 3.5.4.
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limit, the ombudsman proceeds to determination.118 There is no
hearing unless the ombudsman finds it necessary to determine the
complaint.119 However, based on the requirements of Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights,120 the FSA rules provide
for a hearing in certain circumstances.121 To obtain a hearing, a party
must make a written request expressing the issues it wishes to raise so
that the ombudsman may consider whether the issues are material,
whether a hearing should be held, and whether any hearing that
takes place should be public or private.122
After the final appeal stage, the ombudsman makes a ruling. A
distinctive feature of the “ombudsman schemes is that decisions may
be made on grounds of substantive fairness, which may in some cases
override the legal rules.”123 FSMA requires the FOS to consider
complaints in reference to what is “fair and reasonable in all the
circumstances of the case.”124 In making decisions the FOS must take
into account “the relevant law, regulations, regulators’ rules,
guidance and standards, relevant codes of practice and, where
appropriate, what he considers to have been good industry practice
at the relevant time.”125 The ombudsman must make a written
statement of his reasons for the decision, and must require the
claimant to accept or reject the decision by a specified date.126

118. Id.
119. Id. at 3.5.5.
120. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, ¶ 1, opened for signature Nov. 4,
1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5. (“[I]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly. . . .”) (emphasis added).
121. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.5.6 R, 3.5.7 G (“In deciding whether
there should be a hearing and, if so, whether it should be in public or private, the Ombudsman
will have regard to the provisions of the European Convention on Human rights.”).
122. Id. at 3.5.6 R.
123. James, supra note 105, at 192. The overriding criterion to be used in dispute
resolution is for the ombudsman to do “what is, in his opinion, fair and reasonable in all the
circumstances of the case.” Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, § 228(2); FSA
Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.8.1 R., 3.6.1 R.; see also Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000, § 228(2); FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.6.2 G (“Section 228 of the Act
sets the ‘fair and reasonable’ test for the Compulsory Jurisdiction and the Consumer Credit
Jurisdiction and DISP 3.6.1 R extends it to the Voluntary Jurisdiction.”).
124. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 228(2).
125. James, supra note 105, at 192; DISP. 3.8.1(2), 3.6.4.
126. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.6.6 R; Bunney v. Burns Anderson
PLC, [2007] EWHC 1240 (Ch.), ¶ 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/
EWHC/Ch/2007/1240.html.
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Investors may choose not to accept any FOS decisions and may
proceed to the courts if not satisfied.127 However, if the investor
accepts the ombudsman’s decision, it is binding on both the
customer and the business.128 Firms must then abide by the
ombudsman’s decision and do not have the option of appeal.129
Limited judicial review is available, but only with respect to the
process leading up to the decision, and not to its substance.
If favorable to the complainant, the decision may be either a
monetary award130 or a direction.131 The ombudsman may not only
award damages for actual and consequential financial loss, but may
also grant compensation for pain and suffering, damage to
reputation, distress, or inconvenience.132 However, aggregate
damages are subject to a maximum limit of £100,000,133
($147,643)134 including any amount owed under a direction.135 If
the investor rejects a ruling that the firm treated the complaint fairly,
he then must decide whether to drop the complaint, attempt to
settle, or proceed with litigation or arbitration. If the customer
accepts a favorable decision (that the firm treated the investor’s
complaint unfairly), the firm must promptly pay the award or comply
with the direction.136 Monetary awards and directions may be
enforced through litigation137 to the extent of the £100,000
monetary cap.138
The FOS “aim[s] to give clear, jargon-free reasons for [their]

127. Vernon Everitt, Director, Retail Themes, FSA, Remarks at the British and Irish
Ombudsman Association Conference: Regulators and the Ombudsman—The Critical Role of
the Financial Ombudsman Service (Apr. 27, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.bioa.org.uk/docs/ RegulatorsOmbudsmanVernonEveritt.pdf).
128. Annual Review 2007, supra note 113, at ii.
129. Compulsory Jurisdiction, FSMA Explanatory Notes, supra note 98.
130. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 229(2).
131. Id. § 229(3). A direction is tantamount to an injunction.
132. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.2 R.
133. Id. at 3.7.4 R. The Ombudsman may recommend that the firm pays the balance of
an award of an amount more than the maximum, but it is not enforceable and therefore firms
are unlikely to pay that amount. See Bunney v. Burns Anderson PLC, [2007] EWHC 1240
(Ch.), ¶ 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2007/
1240.html.
134. As reported by xe.com on Nov. 21, 2008.
135. See Bunney, ¶ 68.
136. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.12 R.
137. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Schedule 17, ¶ 16 (Money Awards), §
229(9) (Directions).
138. See Bunney, ¶ 68.
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decisions” that the average customer can understand.139 The scheme
accumulates informal precedents, which improve consistency and
predictability for firms. Decisions are then published in divisional
case digests.140 Because the ombudsman is not required to apply the
law, but rather does what he considers fair and reasonable given the
circumstances of the case, decisions rarely provide actual precedential
value.141 These decisions, while available via the FOS website, do not
disclose party identities.142
IV. COMPARISON OF INVESTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS
Comparing both the framework and forum choices of investor
dispute resolution mechanisms reveals some contrast between the
United Kingdom’s FOS and the United States’ FINRA Arbitration.
Where the framework of the FOS allows for a rather collegial
proceeding, FINRA Arbitration amounts to quasi-litigation.
Similarly, forum choice in the FOS allows for multiple avenues of
relief, whereas FINRA Arbitration allows for only limited grounds of
appeal.
A. Framework
Compared to FINRA Arbitration, the FOS seems almost quaint
as the scheme is designed to be inquisitorial rather than adversarial.
Eschewing strict procedural rules, the FOS embraces a highly
informal approach, exemplified by the lack of formal hearings or
face-to-face cross-examinations.143 The ombudsman makes a decision
based only on the prepared documents because in most cases there is
no oral argument. The FOS asserts that because the ombudsmen
“look at the facts of each complaint—not at how well people present
their case . . . no one should need any special expertise or
professional help in order to bring their complaint to [the FOS].”144
139. Financial Ombudsman Service, Our Aims and Values, http://www.financialombudsman.org.uk/about/aims.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
140. James, supra note 105, at 193.
141. See Bunney, ¶ 52.
142. Opinions and case studies are published in the Ombudsman News, a regular
newsletter published by FOS and available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/
publications/ombudsman.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Decisions use party names such as
“AYZ Association” and “Firm CDE.”
143. Financial Ombudsman Service, supra note 139.
144. Id.
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Conversely, FINRA strongly recommends legal representation for
both mediation and arbitration. Brokerage firms in either system
likely employ legal counsel to prepare their submissions. As a result,
the FOS customer complainant may believe that he would be
disadvantaged without professionally prepared documents, and
therefore might hire legal counsel. Moreover, parties are responsible
for their own costs,145 unless the ombudsman uses his discretion to
award costs to prevailing parties.146 Thus, for many customers, the
FOS is not actually cost-free, although it is less expensive than
alternatives.
The difference in cost between the FOS and FINRA directly
affects the jurisdictional hurdles that filter filed cases. Under the FOS
system, despite potential legal costs, there is still no fee-based cost
deterrent for consumers pursuing claims against firms. Therefore, the
time-bar and complaint-exhaustion jurisdictional hurdles act as a
filter.147 Since FINRA complainants must pay an arbitration fee, a
hearing deposit, and attorneys’ fees,148 cost-deterrence serves as a
filter, making strict jurisdictional prerequisites for arbitration
unnecessary. Consequently, the arbitration may proceed to
consideration on the merits subject only to a six-year time limit and
FINRA’s general regulatory jurisdiction.149
With respect to the value of the award, the FOS maximum is
£100,000. The rationale is that disputes involving larger sums
warrant the cost of legal representation and those claims would
proceed to litigation in the absence of the ombudsman.150 FINRA
Arbitration has no statutory cap on the value of awards, but
incorporates a small-claims procedure, by which it diverts claims for
$25,000 or less to a Simplified Arbitration Procedure. Unless the
customer requests a hearing, such claims are decided solely on the

145. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.10.
146. Id. at 3.7.1 R.
147. See Financial Ombudsman Service, Annual Review 1006/2007, How We Dealt with
the Complaints, http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar07/dealt.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2009).
148. FINRA Code, supra note 70, R. 12900(a) (Customer Fees when Customer is
Claimant), R. 12902(a) (Hearing Session Fees).
149. Id. R. 12206 (Time Limits).
150. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.4 R; see id. at 3.7.6 G. Whether this
upper limit is appropriate is an area of dispute between consumers and industry. Lord Hunt’s
Review, Ch. 8, p. 69, http://www.thehuntreview.org.uk/updates/FOS_Report.pdf (last
visited Jan. 30. 2009) (recommending further investigation and review to determine the
probable effects of an increased limit).
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parties’ written submissions, much like the FOS.151
FINRA and FOS also differ in the manner in which they
document opinions. While FINRA does not require written
opinions, the ombudsman must provide a written statement of
reasons.152 The substance of FINRA decisions is generally
confidential. However, FINRADR publishes a summary of all awards
and tracks award payments, permitting staff to initiate suspension
proceedings against an industry party that fails to comply with an
award.153 However, because the FOS is not a public authority subject
to the U.K Freedom of Information Act, it may publish decisions,
but must omit party names.154 Consequently, the FOS offers
guidance to offending companies, but does not name them.
Arguably, this may be disincentivize firms from initially settling
disputes or from taking remedial measures because a poor record will
not affect their reputation.155 However, statistics indicate that the
FOS overcomes this difficulty and is more effective than FINRA
Arbitration.156 Sixty-six percent of the cases submitted to FINRA in
2007, were resolved by mediation or direct settlement,157 while the
FOS resolved ninety-four percent of its cases by informal
settlement.158

151. The arbitrator may request a hearing or require a party to submit additional
documentation. When an arbitrator is deciding the case without a hearing, parties may ask to
submit additional documents. FINRA, How Is Arbitration Begun? http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/P009536 (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
152. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.6.6 R.
153. FINRADR Fact Sheet, supra note 76.
154. Financial Ombudsman Service, Freedom Of Information And Data Protection,
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/about/foi.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The
U.K. Freedom of Information Act 2000 grants a general right of access to information held by
public authorities. Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36) pt. 1, ¶ 1.
155. ADRNOW, Financial Ombudsman Service, http://www.adrnow.org.uk/go/
SubPage_33.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). In September 2007, the board of the FOS
engaged Lord David Hunt to lead an independent review of the FOS and its relationship with
external stakeholders. Financial Ombudsman Service, Openness and Accessibility,
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/updates/openness_accessibility.html.
Among Lord Hunt’s potential uses for the results of his review is a company ranking based on
complaints received or upheld, or both. Richard Dyson, Mail on Sunday (UK), Message to Mr.
Silk (deceased): A Clumsy Request to a Bereaved Daughter shows Ombudsman’s Shortcomings but
Change is on the Way, (Apr. 11, 2007), 2007 WLNR 21848312.
RESOLUTION
STATISTICS,
http://www.finra.org/
156. FINRA,
DISPUTE
ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
157. Id.
158. Annual Review 2007, supra note 113, at 1.
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B. Forum Choice -- Fairness
Both U.S. and U.K. customers can compel firms to submit to
their respective dispute resolution mechanisms, but firms may
preempt customers’ choice through pre-dispute arbitration clauses
only in the United States. Since brokers use these clauses and U.S.
courts enforce them, arbitration is the norm in the United States.159
In the United Kingdom, the FOS provides customers with an
indefeasible choice: if a regulated business will not settle the
complaint initially, it cannot prevent the customer from invoking
FOS jurisdiction through a contractual agreement.160 Furthermore,
U.K. investors have a foolproof option: the FOS decision is binding
on the company, but not on the customer.161 Therefore, the
customer may pursue litigation or arbitration if he is dissatisfied with
the outcome.162
Although U.K. firms cannot compel customers to relinquish
their statutory right to resolve disputes through the ombudsman,
FOS jurisdiction encourages businesses to avoid resorting to its
services.163 As established by the Complaints-Handling Rules of the
FOS, each regulated business must follow a set response to the initial
customer complaint geared towards the earliest possible
resolution.164 Many companies opt to include arbitration or exclusive
jurisdiction clauses in their contracts, but such agreements only take
effect if the customer chooses to not use the ombudsman scheme or
rejects an unsatisfactory award, or if the complaint fails on
jurisdictional or substantive grounds.165 Even then, the
arbitration clause may be void under the U.K.’s Unfair Contract
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations.166 These laws bar
enforcement of unfair contract terms that the consumer did not
negotiate, including arbitration clauses placed in standard customer
agreements by brokerage firms. These clauses are widely upheld in

159. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1139.
160. ADRNOW, supra note 155.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Firms that are subject to the compulsory or voluntary jurisdiction of the FOS are
bound by the consumer’s decision to pursue a complaint with the Ombudsman. See supra
notes 102–03.
164. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 1.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999,
No. 2083 (UK).
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the United States, where “a customer-broker arbitration clause is not
per se unconscionable as a contract of adhesion, nor is an agreement
to arbitrate in accordance with SEC approved procedures
‘unconscionable as a matter of law.’”167
With respect to fairness, the FOS and FINRA Arbitration
produce disparate treatment of successful complainants, unsuccessful
complainants, absolved firms, and censured firms. The FOS appears
to be fair for complainants. Where the complaint is upheld in favor
of the complainant (which happens in roughly one-third of the cases
considered),168 the FOS aims to restore the complainant to the
position he would have been in had he not been wronged.169 The
FOS may award consequential damages in addition to damages for
actual loss, or it may issue a direction. Furthermore, the ombudsman
compelled to follow what is “fair and reasonable under all the
circumstances,” not the law.170 This discretionary standard reflects
the FSA’s “emphasis on more principles-based regulation” that
focuses “on the outcomes that matter, rather than processes and
procedures.”171 When a successful FOS complainant accepts a
satisfactory award, he receives the benefit of finality because the firm
may not appeal. An unsuccessful or unsatisfied complainant may also
benefit from favorable treatment under the ombudsman scheme as
he may choose to proceed in a judicial or arbitral forum.172
The ombudsman scheme does not offer similar benefits for firms.
Absolved firms remain subject to the unsuccessful customer’s lawsuit
or arbitration, while censured firms face binding awards not
necessarily based in law. The £100,000 cap on damages may offer
these firms some solace, as will the overall cost savings of the FOS
167. Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285–86 (9th Cir. 1988)
(internal citation omitted); see also COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1143.
168. In 34% of cases, the ombudsman found the business had not treated the customer’s
complaint fairly. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 113.
169. Everitt Speech, supra note 127.
170. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
171. Press Release, FSA, FSA’s New Investment Rules Come Into Force, (Nov. 1, 2007),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2007/111.shtml (quoting FSA
Director of Retail Policy Dan Waters) (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
172. The United Kingdom offers many options for an arbitral forum, including the
International Chamber of Commerce and the City Disputes Panel (CDP). The CDP was
established in 1994 in London to provide specialist arbitration panels, Cirielli, supra note 1, at
254, and provides “alternative dispute resolution services that are tailored to meet the needs of
the financial services industry, in the UK and internationally.” CITY DISPUTES PANEL,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, http://www.citydisputespanel.org/pages/home.asp
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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system over alternative forums.
FINRA Arbitration offers complainants and firms a standard of
fairness judicially approved in the United States, as discussed in
Section IIA. Arbitrators issue decisions, including injunctive orders
or damage awards, which are final and binding on both parties with
only limited grounds for appeal.173 For absolved firms and
unsuccessful customers, this is the most important difference
between FINRA Arbitration and the FOS. FINRA Arbitration offers
finality benefits for either side when successful, permitting absolved
firms to shield themselves from looming appeals. Unsuccessful
complainants, however, are bound by decisions and may litigate their
claims only under limited circumstances.174 FINRA Arbitration
typically generates decisions based on the law chosen by firms to
govern their standard customer agreements. Unlike the FOS system,
customers using the FINRA system may see a disadvantage in the
arbitrator’s lack of express authority to decide a dispute based on
fairness in the circumstances. Because there is no requirement of a
reasoned opinion and decisions are made by consensus, in some cases
the arbitrators may issue awards that are motivated by principles of
equity.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Following the MacMahon decision in the United States, changes
to securities arbitration procedures have increasingly shifted the
dispute resolution process closer to litigation.175 This shift towards
litigation-type techniques has made more accessible alternatives
necessary. The development of substitutes for the alternative dispute
resolution scheme in the United States may be evidence that the
current first-and-only resort mechanism is not the most efficient
solution.
Broker-dealers in the United States have long assumed that
arbitration is the most attractive alternative to litigation because “it is
devised as a prompt and inexpensive means of resolving complicated
issues.”176 As that assumption no longer holds true, the United
Kingdom’s success with the financial ombudsman scheme suggests a

173. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1143.
174. FINRA, Arbitration Process, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Parties/
ArbitrationProcess/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
175. See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 423; Black & Gross, supra note 64, at 992.
176. FINRA, supra note 174.
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more cost-effective solution. The FOS covers a much larger
spectrum of complaints than FINRA, and does so at a relatively
lower cost to firms and at no cost to pro se consumers.
The FINRA Mediation Program, which has developed as an
extension of FINRA Arbitration,177 most closely mirrors the FOS
scheme and offers an attractive alternative to arbitration in the
United States. Parties to FINRA dispute resolution may agree to
mediation at any point in the process. FINRA mediation’s overall
settlement rate of investment disputes exceeds eighty percent.178
With an emphasis on mediation, the U.S. system may begin to
approximate the U.K. ombudsman system, at least with respect to
disputes involving lesser sums.
Mediation is a natural first step in dispute resolution, offering an
informal, voluntary approach under which a mediator facilitates
negotiations between parties.179 The mediator does not impose the
solution, but rather “helps make it possible for the parties to craft
and accept the solution themselves, swiftly and inexpensively.”180 The
agreement reached is binding on the parties only if both sides accept
it. The parties may lose the benefits of finality if they reject an
agreement, but if parties accept an agreement, the result will likely be
net positive. The mediator’s objective is to help the parties arrive at a
mutually acceptable resolution, and therefore, a positive, costeffective result is likely.181
VI. CONCLUSION
The financial dispute resolution schemes available in the United
States and United Kingdom provide differing approaches deriving
from their distinct statutory, regulatory, and judicial histories. As
cross-border securities offerings and global brokerage firms
complexify and intertwine international securities markets, customer177. FINRA Investor Brochure, supra note 20, at 3.
178. Id. at 11.
179. Id. at 10.
180. Id.
181. Of the 111,673 disputes FOS resolved in the April 2006-March 2007 financial year,
104,831 cases were resolved by mediation, recommended settlements and adjudications, while
only 6,842 cases were resolved by an ombudsman making a formal decision at the final appeal
stage of the dispute resolution process. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 113. Of the 5,000
cases resolved by FINRADR in 2007, 3,291 were resolved by mediation or direct settlement
and only 1,048 were decided by arbitrators. FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/Statistics/index.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009).

97

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 5

broker disputes will become more frequent. In this environment, an
emphasis on mediation-based resolution in the United States would
provide a low-cost, less formal alternative to litigation, similar to that
enjoyed under the FOS in the United Kingdom.
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